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Summary findings
Svensson exploits a unique data set on corruption  business operations. And the amount paid in bribes is not
containing information about estimated bribe payments  a fixed sum for a set of public services but depends on
by Ugandan firms. To guide the empirical analysis he  the firm's ability to pay.
develops a simple rent-extortion  model, which yields  Controlling for other potential explanations of the
predictions on both the incidence of bribery and the  relationship between "ability to pay" and equilibrium
amount paid. Both predictions are consistent with the  graft, Svensson shows that the more a firm can pay, the
data.  more it has to pay.
Firms typically have to pay bribes when dealing with
public officials whose actions directly affect the firms'
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Until recently it was considered impossible to systematically  measure corruption
at the firm level. As a result, questions  such as "who must  pay bribes"  and  "how
much"  were at best supported  by anecdotal evidence.  However, with appropriate
survey methods and interview techniques firm managers are willing to discuss cor-
ruption with remarkable candor.  Thus, quantitative  micro data  on corruption  can
be collected.  This paper  exploits an unique data  set  containing  such information
for a  cross-section of firms in  Uganda.  We find that  the incidence  of bribery  is
positively  correlated  with  bureaucrats'  control rights  over firms'  business opera-
tions.  Firms typically have to pay bribes when dealing with public officials whose
actions directly affect the firms' business operations,  and such dealings cannot be
easily avoided when, for example, exporting, importing,  or requiring public infras-
tructure  services. The amount  paid, in turn,  is a function  of firm characteristics:
a firm's  current  and expected  future profits and to what  extent  the firm's  capital
stock is sunk.  Thus,  demanded  bribes  do not  appear  to  be fixed sums for given
public  services, but  depend on firms'  abilities to  pay.  Controlling  for other  po-
tential  explanations  of the relationship  between "ability  to pay"  and  equilibrium
graft, we show that  the more a firm could pay the more it has to pay.
To guide the empirical  analysis on the incidence and level of graft we develop
a  simple principal  agent  model.  The model  rests on  three  assumptions.'  First,
bureaucrats  are assumed  to  be expected  profit  maximizers,  subject  to  the  con-
straints  that  the  firm might exit  and  that  the bureaucrat  might  get caught  and
punished.  Second, by exiting  (which broadly should be interpreted  as moving to
another  sector/region  or  using alternative  production  techniques  so as  to mini-
mize contacts  with  the bureaucracy)  firms can avoid paying  bribes.  Third,  there
are many bureaucrats,  each being uncertain  of remaining in a position  to extract
rents.  Based  on  these  three  assumptions  we develop a  simple  rent-extraction
model.  The model produces  a set of structural  equations  on the relationship  be-
tween firm characteristics  and  the incidence and level of corruption  that  we take
to the data.
'These assumptions are grounded in case-study evidence  of corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa
and elsewhere. Thomas (1999)  argues that the lack of control over personnel decisions,  the lack
of performance-based evaluations and hiring, and the  power to  fire government post-holders
instantly with minimal explanation, have given bureaucrats and office  holders with hiring and
firing power  opportunity to demand a share of the income stream from those lower  in the hierar-
chy. Increased uncertainty of tenure has also created strong incentives for those in government
posts to extract as much and as quickly as possible to protect against impending unemployment
or transfer to a less lucrative position (see also Bayart, 1993). De Soto (1989), Johnson et al.
(1998), Johnson et al.  (2000), and Friedman et al.  (2000) show that corruption (opportunity of
rent extraction) drives firms to the unofficial  economy.
2Modern  research on the economics of corruption  began  with  Rose-Ackerman
(1975,  1978).  However,  despite  its  practical  importance  for  many  developing
countries,  economic studies  on  corruption  at  the  firm level  are  rather  limited.
Shleifer and  Vishny (1993) analyze a bureaucracy  selling a government-produced
good (e.g., a permit),  noting that  if the officials do not coordinate  to extract  bribes
they  fail to  internalize  the  effect of their  demands  for  bribes  on other  officials'
income,  leading  to  very  high  corruption  levels.  Moreover,  they  argue  that  the
need for secrecy makes corruption  much more distortionary  than  taxation.  Bliss
and  Di Tella (1997) study  the  relationship  between corruption  and  competition.
They show that  if bureaucrats  have the power to extract  money from firms under
their  control,  they will drive the most  inefficient firms out  of business, enhancing
the  profitability  of remaining  firms, which in turn  makes it  possible  to  demand
larger bribes.  Choi and  Thum  (1999) use a similar model to  study  the effects of
repeated  extortion.2 Our model  builds  on this  body  of work, although  it differs
in one key aspect:  firms'  ability to pay bribes  or avoid them  differs in observable
ways, so public officials make different bribe  demands  across firms.
The empirical literature  on corruption has recently experienced a boom. Mauro
(1995) analyzes the relationship  between investment and corruption,  showing that
corruption  has a substantially  negative effect on private  investment  and  growth.
Wei (1997a,b) finds that  corruption  discourages foreign investment,  and  more so
than  direct  taxation.  Tanzi  and  Davoodi  (1997) study  the  effect of corruption
on  public finance.  They  find that  corruption  adversely  affects both  the  compo-
sition  and  level of public  expenditures/investment.  Kaufmann  and  Wei  (1998)
examine  the relationship  between corruption  and management  time  wasted  with
bureaucrats.  Contrary  to  the  "efficient grease"  argument,  they  find  that  firms
that  face more  "bribe  demand"  are also likely to  spend  more management  time
with bureaucrats.  Ades and Di Tella (1997, 1999), Svensson (2000), and  Treisman
(2000) deal with  the  causes  of corruption.  Ades and  Di Tella  (1997, 1999) find
that  corruption  is higher  in countries  with  more active industrial  policy, and  in
countries  where firms enjoy higher natural  or policy induced  rents,  while Svens-
son (1998) shows that  foreign aid is associated with higher corruption  in polarized
societies,  but  that  democracies  seem to  be  less subject  to  this  adverse  effect of
aid.  Treisman  (2000) test  several hypotheses  on the determinants  of corruption.
He shows that  countries  with  protestant  traditions,  histories  of British  rule, and
long exposure  to  democracy  are less corrupt.
This paper extends the empirical literature  in two ways. First,  we use firm-level
data  on corruption.  The existing body of empirical work is based on cross-country
analyses that  tell us little  about  the relationship  between corruption  and individ-
ual  firms.  Second, our  data  set  contains  quantitative  information  on  estimated
2For  recent surveys  of the literature  on corruption,  see Bardhan  (1997) and Wei (1999).
3bribe payments  of Ugandan  firms. The existing empirical literature  exploits data
on corruption derived from perception indices, typically constructed  from foreign
experts'  assessments of overall corruption  in a country. While making it possible
to study broader macro determinants  and consequences of corruption,  it also raises
concern about perception biases that  we avoid by using quantitative  information.3
This paper  is organized as follows. In section 2 a simple model is presented.
Section 3 discusses the implication of relaxing some of the simplifying assumptions
in the  model.  Section 4 takes the  model's prediction  to  the  data  and  discusses
the empirical findings.  Section 5 and  appendix  A.2.  deal with  implications  and
extensions, and  section 6 concludes.
2.  A Model  for  Estimating  the  Incidence  and  Level  of Graft
Below we set out a simple model to guide the empirical work. The objective is to
show that  firm-specific features  should have implications  for both  the  incidence
and level of graft.  To derive explicit solutions to the graft level equation  we make
a number of simplifying assumptions.  In section 3 and appendix  A.2. we discuss
the effects of relaxing them.
Consider an economy consisting of a large number of firms and  bureaucrats.
Each firm is in the territory  of one bureaucrat. We assume that  the bureaucrats  are
expected profit maximizers.  Thus, in each period he maximizes bribe payments
subject  to the  constraints  that  the firm might exit  (in which case no bribes  are
collected), and  that  he might get caught and punished.
The bureaucrats  have discretionary power within the given regulatory  system
in the sense that  they can  customize the nature  and  amount  of harassment  on
firms to extract  bribes.  The extent  to  which this  could be  done depends on the
bureaucrats'  "control rights" over the firms' business operations.  We consider only
private  firms so by control rights  we mean  the extent  to which the  bureaucrats
can constrain the firms'  business decisions and influence their  cash flows. These
indirect control rights steni from the existing regulatory system  and the fact that
bureaucrats  have discretion in implementing, executing, and  enforcing rules and
benefits affecting firms, such as business regulations,  licensing requirements,  per-
missions, taxes, exemptions,  and public-goods provision.
3 Kaufmann  and  Wei (1998) also use firm-level data  (based on the  Global  Competitiveness
Report  index) to assess the validation of the "grease argument".  However, the data on corruption
and  its correlates  are based on answers to questions referring to the  country  in which the  firm is
active,  rather  than  firm-specific experiences and  characteristics.  Moreover the  data  is primarily
of  a  qualitative  nature  (indices).  Ades and  Di  Tella (1999)  utilize the  same  source  but  use
country  averages.
4As in Shleifer and Vishny (1994) we could think of the degree of control rights
as  determining  the  threat  point or the  leverage in the  "negotiation"  between  a
public official and  a firm.  When bureaucrats  have low control rights  a firm may
refuse to pay the demanded bribes without any major consequences on its business
operations.  However, when bureaucrats  have high control  rights,  the firm must
either  pay the bribe or exit.
Bureaucrats'  degree of control rights differ across sector and  location.  As an
example,  bureaucrats'  control  over exporting  firms is typically  high  since such
firms need additional licenses (to export)  and have to deal with more government
agencies  (such  as customs),  while bureaucrats'  control  rights  over firms in  the
informal  sector  are low since such firms seldom deal  with  bureaucrats  and  (by
assumption)  operate  outside the formal and  regulated economy.  To simplify, we
assume  there  are two sectors,  j  =  {s1, s2},  which differ with  respect  to  bureau-
cratic control.  Specifically, firms in sector s, must pay if bribes  are demanded,  or
exit, while firms in sector 82  have enough leverage to avoid paying bribes without
any significant impact  on their business operations.
A bureaucrat  dealing with  a firm in sector s,  will demand  a bribe  if the  ex-
pected  gain of receiving the bribe is larger than  the expected  cost.  That  is,
g - 6mg > 0
where g is the graft and 6 is the probability of getting  caught.  We assume that  the
punishment  of getting  caught  (or personal cost of being fired under  corruption  ac-
cusations) is proportional  to the bribe payment, with m  > 0 being the punishment
coefficient. Thus,  6mg is expected punishment  (or cost) of demanding  bribes.
As in Ades and Di Tella (1999), Erard  and  Feinstein  (1994), and  others,  we
allow for the  existence  of both  honest  and  dishonest  public  officials.  Thus  we
assume  that  the personal  cost m  differs across individuals.  The distribution  of
m is assumed  to  be uniform over [0,  mh]  and  is known to  all players.  Further,  to
capture  the inherent uncertainty  of tenure we assume that  the bureaucrats  at each
time period face an exogenously given probability  1 - q of being fired.4
At time  0, the  bureaucrats  must  choose what  sector to  work in.  The  wage
rate is normalized to zero. Each sector (i.e., public agencies interacting  with firms
in  that  sector)  employs 50 percent  of the  total  number  of public  servants.  A
bureaucrat  who is indifferent between working in sector s, or  S2 will be randomly
selected into a sector with openings.
The equilibrium allocation of public servants is easy to characterize.  All public
servants  with personal  cost m  < 6-1, i.e., bureaucrats  that  will always ask for a
bribe,  will choose to  work with  firms in sector  sl,  while all  civil servants  with
4A fired public servant is assumed to be replaced by a new bureaucrat with the same char-
acteristics.
5personal cost m > 6-1 will be randomly allocated  to the remaining openings.  The
probability  p that  a randomly picked bureaucrat  in sector s,  will ask for bribes is
hence p =  1 - (6fi)-'  if 6'  <  2  nd p = 1 otherwise.  Bureaucrats  more prone
to  demand  bribes  will choose to work in agencies that  have discretionary  power
over firms.5
The  probability  that  a randomly  drawn  firm i  must  pay  bribes,  denoted  by
p(i),  can now be stated  as
p(i)  =  a(i  E  s,)  * p  (2.1)
where o(i  e  s,)  is the probability  that  firm i is active in sector s1.
Given that  a  firm is matched  with  a corrupt  bureaucrat  in  period  t,  we can
solve explicitly for the probability  of that  firm being forced to  pay bribes in each
future period (as evaluated from period t), Pt+n. This probability  function is given
by Pt+n  = q-  qfp + p.
There  exists a large number of firms.  Firms'  objective  is to maximize  present
discounted  value of expected  cash flows (i.e., profits  net  of bribes).  Each firm i
is endowed with  capital  k  and  an  individual-specific  skill factor  qi  (knowledge)
of production  in  sector  si.  q1 is distributed  according  to  a known  distribution
function  G(.).  Invested  capital  is partly  sunk.  Let a'  be  the  share  of invested
capital  that  could be  resold  and  reinvested;  that  is,  a  captures  the  sunk  cost
component  of the  firm's  production  technology.  At time  0 each  firm faces the
choice of either  investing  in sector  s1 or in  sector  82.  Due to  indivisibilities  of
capital,  the firm must  decide to invest in only one sector.
The firms produce goods xl and x2, which are traded on the world market.  The
world market  prices  0  and  1, respectively,  are exogenously given as the  country
is a price taker.  The  production  technologies are given by xl  =  f(k0, l1; f)  and
xi  = f(ki,  li), where f,7 >  0 and 1 is labor.  There  is unlimited  labor supply  at the
wage rate  w (markup on the rural  subsistence wage).  We assume  that  the  price
of good  1 is uncertain;  that  is, Ot is a stochastic  variable.  Ot is assumed  to  be
independently  and identically  distributed  over time, with  bounded  support  [W  6  ].
Time  t  profit  in  sector  s1 can then  be  written  as a  function  of the  observable
inputs  k and 1,
7r(k,  1(w/Ot);  i,  Ot I  s,)  =  Otf (k, l(w/0t);  2)  - wl(w/9t),
where firm-specific superscripts  have been dropped for convenience and where the
labor demand function,  l(w/Ot), is implicitly defined by the first-order  condition,
5This endogenous  response  to differences in control rights  is consistent  with recent  empirical
evidence on corruption  in the public sector.  For example,  results  from surveys of public officials
in  Albania,  Georgia,  and  Latvia  suggest  that  there  may  even  be  a  market  for  "high  rent"
positions  (World Bank,  1998a, see also Thomas,  1999).
6Otfi(k, 1;  7) - w = 0.  Thus,  at each time period the  firms adjust  their  labor force
such that  the marginal product  of labor is equal to the real wage.  Similarly, period
t  profits in sector  82  are 7rt(k, l(w) I  s2) = f (k, I(w))  - wl(w).
With  no bribes,  firm i:s value functions are,
Vt(kij)=EtE  n- 1ir(k,Ij)  forj=J{s,S 2},  (2.2)
n=1
where  Et is the  expectation  operator  conditional  on information  at  time  t.  If a
firm invests in sector sj  and faces a corrupt  bureaucrat,  the firm must  either  pay
the required bribe or exit the sector.  The latter  constitutes  an optimal response if
the expected loss of exiting  (foregone net profits today  and in the future)  is lower
than  the expected  gain (alternative  return  on reversible  capital).  That  is,
ir(k, Ot,.  Is)  - g(Ot)  +t  t F 1 /3n'  [ir(k,  Ot+n, 1  Si) -Pt+n(Si)9(Ot+n)]
(2.3)
nN=l  -17r  (a!k,  -I S2)  X
where g(Ot) is graft  in  period t  as a function  of Ot. In (2.3),  the  first  two terms
are current  net  profit when  facing  a corrupt  bureaucrat.  The  third  expression
is expected  discounted  future  net  profits.  In  each period  t + n  the  firm makes
expected profit Et7r(k, Ot+n,  | SO) (evaluated  at t),  and with  a probability  Pt+n(Si)
faces a corrupt  official and  must  also pay bribes.  The term  on the  right  side of
the exit  constraint  (2.3) is the  discounted  flow of profits  the  firm would make if
it sold and  reinvested  its partly  sunk capital  in sector  S2 the first  period.
Firms  cannot  borrow to pay bribes,  so in each period  the  firms'  realized cash
flow must  be non-negative;  that  is, 6
7r(k, Ot, | sl)  - g(Ot)  > 0  (2.4)
for all t.
We can now determine  the equilibrium  graft.  Assume (2.4) holds  (a sufficient
condition  is stated  below).  The corrupt  bureaucrat  will demand  bribe  payments
so as (2.3) just  binds.  Note that  Et7r(k, 
0 t+n, -I Sl)  is constant  and independent  of
Ot  for all n > 1. Thus  the expected  optimal bribe payment  Etg* (Ot+n)  is constant
and  independent  of Ot  for all n > 1. Consequently,  at each time  period  t + n, the
corrupt  bureaucrat  faces an  "exit  constraint"  (2.3) that  is identical  apart  from
the  first term,  current  profit 7r(k,  Ot, | si).  Rewriting  (2.3) yields,
~~~~~~~~~~~~~00
g(Ot)  = 7r(Ot,  .1  sl)+Et  o  n3  [ir(Ot+n,  I  s1)  -Pt+n(S1)9(0t+n)0_  ,3n-r(ak, -S2).
n=1  n=1
(2.5)
6The results  are not qualitatively  affected  if we  allow  the firms  to borrow.
7Equation  (2.5) gives a mapping from the  space of possible g(O) into itself:  a
given g(O) implies an expected future  flow of net profits, which in turn  implies a
new g(9) from (2.5). The fixed point of this mapping is,
g*i(o0)  =  r(k,  Ot, .1  sl) +  r(k,  lis  )-i)-  7 1 rak(o  S2)  (26)
where *(k,*  sl)  _  Et7r(k, 9t+,,-I sl)  for all n >  1, and p' _  ,q(iO)+P  )  and
I,V  =  00l-00(-P)  7
PI  -(1-)(1-qj)-
Equation  (2.6) suggests that the amount of bribes a firm needs to pay depends
on current profits  (+),  expected future profits (+),  and the  alternative  return  to
capital  (-),  7r(ak). Having a technology with low sunk cost component strength-
ens the firm's  "bargaining" position in that  exiting becomes more profitable.  As
a  result the  public official will demand a  lower bribe.  Higher profits  today  or
higher expected future profits have the reverse effect, the firm's  bargaining posi-
tion weakens and it is forced to pay higher bribes.
Furthermore,  equation  (2.6) implies that  g(Ot) is a negative function of p (and
indirectly of p).  That  is, the lower the probability that  bureaucrats  will demand
bribes, the higher the equilibrium graft when matched with a corrupt bureaucrat.
Expected graft, p * g(Ot), however, is a positive function of p.  The reason for this
result is simple.  Everything else being equal, a lower p (and p) implies increased
expected future  net  profits.  Higher future  profits  weaken the  firm's  bargaining
position  since exiting  becomes relatively  more costly.  As a result,  the  corrupt
bureaucrat  can demand higher graft.  In equilibrium, the increase in g(Ot) cannot
outweigh the fall in p, since that  would imply that  a lower p would result in lower
expected future net profits,  and thus lower g(Ot) - a contradiction.
From (2.6) it is straightforward  to determine under  what  conditions the bor-
rowing constraint  (2.4) holds. Specifically, equation  (2.4) holds if
1  -q)  (0Ok,1a,  82)  <  (2.7)
p(l  -q)-T(k,  li, *tsi)-
7To  solve the fixed  point problem  note that  for  the exit constraint to bind in every period the
difference  d _ ir(k, 0, .1  si) - g(0) must be constant over time. Substituting d into (2.5), noting
that
-C
Et E  fl  Lpt+,d  + (1  - pt+.)7rt+n]  =
n=l
-pq(lp)  +  1  Ppd  +  (1-p)p(3  d1  q  Et?rt+n 
and rearranging  yields expression  (2.6).
8Thus, if p is sufficiently high, equilibrium graft is always less than  gross profit.
Equations  (2.1) and  (2.6) provide a structural  model  of the  relationship  be-
tween graft  and  firm characteristics.  The  incidence of bribery  is a  function  of
where the  firms choose to  locate,  the  firms'  main areas  of activities,  as well as
the expected  personal cost to  the bureaucrat  of being fired under  corruption  ac-
cusations.  Given  that  a firm faces a  corrupt  official and  must  pay  bribes,  the
amount paid depends  on firm characteristics:  current profits, the extent  to which
the firm's  capital is sunk, and expected future  profits.
Before proceeding to estimate equations  (2.1) and (2.6), it is useful to consider
relaxing some of the simplifying assumptions  in the model.  This  is important  not
only to show to that  the model's qualitative  results  are robust  to alterations,  but
also to  better  understand  the empirical findings presented  below.
3.  Extensions  and  implications
In reality, a  bureaucrat  does not  have full information  about  a firm from whom
he  wishes to  extract  bribes.  The shock 0 and  profits  are not  directly  observed,
neither  is the  sunk cost  component.  As illustrated  in  an  example  in  appendix
A.2.,  incomplete  information  will create  informational  rents  that  the  firm  can
capture.  Thus,  the  linear  relationship  between  profits  and  grafts  identified  in
equation  (2.6) will only be  an  approximation.  The qualitative  results,  however,
remain  when introducing  asymmetric  information.
The  likelihood of facing  a  corrupt  bureaucrat  in  the  future  is uncertain  in
the  model.  This  likelihood is a function  of a number  of exogenous  parameters;
probability  of getting  caught,  distribution  of the  personal  cost  of getting  fired
under  corruption  accusations,  and  the  inherent  uncertainty  of tenure,  but  also
depends  on the endogenous  choice of bureaucrats  to  differences in control  rights
across sectors.  With  no uncertainty,  a one-period  model would  suffice to  study
the problem,  since future  profits, tr(k, P, -I  sl),  would then  not  matter.
In the model, each firm is in the territory  of one bureaucrat.  As in Bliss and Di
Tella (1997) and Choi and Thum (1999), we thus abstract  from coordination issues
and competition  among public officials. Allowing competition  among bureaucrats
would in  some instances  increase  the  firm's  bargaining  power  and  thus  reduce
the  equilibrium  graft,  given 7r(k,Ot,  -Is),  tr(k,li, -Is),  and 7r(ak,  .1s2).  Still the
qualitative  relationship  between  profits,  alternative  return, and corruption  would
remain.8
We have taken  the technology choice as given, i.e., the  sunk-cost  component
8However,  to the extent that officials  impose costs rather than benefits, it is not clear why
competition would reduce corruption (see discussion in Rose-Ackerman, 1999).
9(asi) is exogenous.  Allowing the  firm to  choose what  capital  goods to  purchase
complicates the picture  (the technology choice in a model of repeated  rent extor-
tion  is studied  in detail  in Choi and  Thum,  1999).  In our model,  the extent  to
which capital  investments  are sunk or not  influences the  firm's  bargaining  posi-
tion versus the bureaucrat.  Low sunk costs imply that  the cost of exiting becomes
smaller, and from equation  (2.6), lower grafts when matched  with a corrupt  offi-
cial.  Thus,  the firm might find it profitable to  choose a  "technology" that  yields
higher per-period operation  costs but  indirectly reduces the amount of bribes the
firm needs  to pay.  In appendix  A.2.  we endogenize the  choice of ai  and  show
that  the  choice of technology  depends  on the  parameters  of the  model,  and  in
particular  on p.  If the incidence of bribery is high, the relative return  of adopting
a technology with inefficiently low sunk cost component is also high.  For the em-
pirical work it should be noted that  the "technology-effect"  would tend  to mask
the  negative relationship  between the  sunk-cost component  and  corruption,  and
thus work against  us.
Maybe the  most  restrictive  assumption  of the model is the  assumption  that
profits  are  not  influenced by the  amount  of bribes  paid,  and  that  there  is no
feedback from corruption  to equilibrium profits  (through  entry  and  exit into the
market).9 Our choice to abstract  from these effects does not imply that  we do not
think they  might be important.  However, we believe our more restrictive  set-up
is a good first  approximation  for two reasons.  First,  most  firms  in the  sample
are small (median is 34 employee).  Causal empiricism  suggests that  the regula-
tory process is not captured  by these types of firms in less developed countries in
general and in Uganda in particular,  but  a small set of large, politically powerful
enterprises.  Second, the  inherent  uncertainty  of tenure  for those  in government
posts,  documented  by for example Thomas  (1999), suggests that  public officials
heavily  discount the future.  Thus,  dynarnic graft-schemes that  intend  to  maxi-
mize revenue by implicitly controlling entry and exit may simply not  be credible,
since the uncertainty  of tenure  creates strong incentives for those in government
posts to extract  as much and as quickly as possible to protect  against  impending
unemployment or transfer  to a less lucrative position.  Finally, the feedback from
corruption  to  profits  has  already  been extensively studied  in the  literature  (see
Bliss and Di Tella, 1997). Therefore we abstract  from it in order  to focus on the
novel issue of determining  the differences in bribe demands across firms.
Despite these arguments it is crucial to evaluate how the results  would change
9For models on rent-seeking see Buchanan, 1980;  Tollison, 1982; Tullock, 1967, Bhagwati,
1982;  Krueger, 1974. On regulatory capture see Laffont and Tirole, 1994,  and references  given
therein. Bliss and Di Tella, 1997;  and Choi and Thum, 1999,  develop  extortion models in which
the public official  chooses graft, where corruption may cause exit (or restrict entry) which may
affect profits of the remaining firms and thus their potential to pay bribes.
10if these effects were allowed in the model.  The rent-seeking and regulatory  capture
models would also predict  a positive relationship  between profits  and  corruption.
In these types of models the association  arises because bureaucrats  and politicians
compete  for rents  associated  with  bribes  and  kickbacks  by  selling government
favors.  Alternatively,  regulations  benefiting  firms are  "acquired"  by  industries
through  bribes.  Thus,  the relationship  is driven by reverse causation.  Note  that
the  predicted  association  between  the share  of sunk  investments  and  corruption
would not  arise from these models.  Moreover, as discussed below, for the reverse
causation  argument  to  bias  the  results  it must  be  the  case that  the  size of the
government  favor is linked to  the  amount  paid  in bribes.  A simple  extension  of
the model  (yielding the same empirical  predictions)  is that  all bribe-paying  firms
receive preferential  government  treatment,  for  instance  they  obtain  a  valuable
license.  Our identifying assumption  is that  the price of this  license is determined
by the firm's ability  to pay.
The extortion  model of Bliss and Di Tella (1997), where corruption  may cause
exit  (or restrict  entry)  which may affect profits  of the  remaining  firms and  thus
their  potential  to  pay  bribes,  would  also suggest a  positive  association  between
bribes and  profits.  The interpretation,  however, would be slightly different:  prof-
itable  firms  are  forced  to  pay  higher  bribes  but  one  reason  for  why  they  are
profitable  in the first  hand  is that  they could "afford"  to pay  bribes  while other
potential  competitors  which could not  have been driven out  of the market.
As discussed in  detail in section 4.3, empirically we try  to  separate  the  afore-
mentioned effects by instrumenting  for profits.
4.  Estimating  the  Incidence  and  Level  of Graft
4.1.  Specification
Equations  (2.1) and  (2.6) provide a structural  framework to  study  the  incidence
and level of graft across firms. The incidence equation  (2.1) states  that  the prob-
ability that  a randomly  drawn firm i must pay bribes  depends  on sector/location
specific factors and on the personal cost to the bureaucrat  of getting  caught.  This
personal  cost  is not  observable,  and  we choose  to  capture  it  with  the  random
variable v. Thus
p  =  xwi  +±  ,  (4.1)
where wi is a vector  of sector and  location  specific variables.  Since pi  is not  ob-
served, we have to reformulate the incidence equation  as follows. Let et = 1 be the
event that  a firm faces a corrupt  bureaucrat  and must  pay bribes  (gi >  0). Then,
Pr (ei =  1) =  4S(X'wi)  (4.2)
11where (I is the standard  normal distribution  function.
To estimate the graft level equation  (2.6) we replace the unobserved Et7r(k,  1,.)
with  current  stock of capital,  k, and labor, 1, plus a forecast/measurement  error
El, and the unobserved 7r(ak,  ) with a proxy of aik plus a measurement  error  £2.
The resulting specification is
i  +  ±,,  7r' + 'ykk' + ,  I  + 'Qkcak' + 1u t,  gi > 0  (4.3)
where 'yo, y,  , 'Yk, 'e 'ylak  are coefficients and pi =  1 + E2.  We assume that  vi and
pi  have a  bivariate  normal  distribution  with zero means  and  correlation  6, and
let os.,  denote the standard  deviation of ,y. According to the model -y,, _yk,  71 >  0
and  Yak  < 0.
The sample  selection model  (4.2)-(4.3) can be estimated  by a two-step  pro-
cedure  (see  Heckman,  1979), where  in  the  second step  the  inverse Mials ratio
A=  i  (%jwi) /,  (k'wi)  is included to adjust  for the sample selection bias.  Thus,
the empirical specification is,
=70  YO±  7r  +  Ykkz  +  -/Il  +  7.kaYk  +  a  Ai +  vi  (4.4)
where 'YA  6%.  Note that  the disturbance  term in the second stage regression is
heteroskedastic,
Var(vi) =  0,2  (1  _  62-i)
with  (i = Ai(Ai  +± 'wi).
4.2. Data
Before proceeding it is useful to take an initial look at some of the data.  All data
used in the paper is from the Ugandan Industrial  Enterprise  Survey (see appendix
for details).  The survey was initiated  by the World Bank primarily to collect data
on constraints  facing private  enterprises in Uganda.  It  was implemented  during
the period January-June  1998.
Until recently it was considered impossible to systematically collect micro data
on corruption.  However, with  appropriate  survey  methods  and  interview  tech-
niques firm managers  are willing to  discuss corruption  with  remarkable  candor.
Thus,  quantitative  firm-level data  on corruption  can be  collected.  The empirical
strategy  used to  collect information  on bribe  payments  across firms in  Uganda
had  the following six key components.  First,  the survey was implemented  by an
employers' association (Ugandan Manufacturers  Association).  Given the business
community's  general distrust  of the public sector, it was decided that  the survey
should be  implemented  by an agency that  most  firms had  confidence in,  rather
12than, for example, the statistics  department.  Second, the corruption  related ques-
tions  (and the  whole survey instrument)  were carefully piloted  and  built  on ex-
isting surveys on regulatory  constraints.  Third,  the enumerators  were trained  by
survey experts.  Fourth,  the questions  on corruption  were phrased  in an  indirect
fashion to avoid implicating the respondent  of wrongdoing.  For example,  the key
question  on bribe  payments  was reported  under  the  following question,  "Many
business people have told us that  firms are often required  to make informal  pay-
ments to public officials to deal with customs, taxes, licenses, regulations,  services,
etc.  Can you estimate  what  a firm in your line of business and of similar  size and
characteristics  typically  pays each year?".  Fifth,  the corruption-related  questions
were asked at the end of the interview, by which time the enumerator  (hopefully)
had established  necessary credibility and trust.  Finally, to  enhance the reliability
of the  corruption  data,  multiple  questions  on corruption  were asked in  different
sections of the  questionnaire.1°  Consistent  findings across measures  significantly
increase the reliability  of the  data.  The data  collection effort was also aided by
the fact that  the issue of corruption  has been partly desensitized in Uganda.  Over
the past  few years  several awareness-raising campaigns  have been  implemented
on the subject  and  the media regularly reports  on corruption  cases." 1
It is worth noting that  even with underreporting  and non-responses, as long as
the sample is representative  and  the misreporting  is not  systematically  correlated
with the firm characteristics,  these problems only stack the deck against  us.
We were able to  collect bribery  data  for  176 firms out  of 243 sampled.  Of
the  67 firms that  did  not  respond  to  the  corruption  question,  about  one  third
refused to  answer other  sensitive questions  in the questionnaire  (e.g., about  cost
and sales).  As a group, the approximately  40 firms that  declined to answer specific
questions about corruption  did not differ significantly with respect  to size, profits,
and location  from the group  of graft-reporting  firms.  Thus,  we find no evidence
that  the sample is not  representative.
We collected  answers to  multiple  questions  on  corruption.  The  key corrup-
tion variable  we exploit  below is reported  bribe  payment.  Two other  variables
are related  to  delivery of public  services.  The  respondents  were asked  the total
cost  (including  informal  payments)  of getting  connected  to  the  public  grid  and
acquiring a telephone line.  As discussed in Svensson (1999), controlling for loca-
tion (with  respect  to public  grid),  these are services for which one would expect
firms to pay the  same amount  to acquire.  Thus,  deviations  from  the given price
l°The survey instrument had roughly 150  questions (500  entries), a handful which  were related
to corruption. Given  the length of the questionnaire,  the survey was labor and time intensive  and
typically  consisted of at least two visits to each firm by one or two enumerators to accommodate
the manager's time schedule.
"See  Ruzindana et al.  (1998) and World Bank (1998b).
13typically reflect graft.  Of the 25 firms that  had been connected to the public grid
over the past  three  years, all reported  positive bribe payments.  The partial  corre-
lation  (controlling for location)  between connection costs and bribes  is 0.67. The
picture  is similar for deviations from the fixed price of a telephone connection.  Of
those 77 firms that  reported  positive deviations,  15 did not report bribe data.  The
simple correlation between the excess price of telephone connections and  reported
bribe payments  for the remaining  firms is 0.41.  The  correlations  are  illustrated
in Figures 1-2 and  simple regressions are reported  in Table  1. To summarize,  re-
ported  bribe payment  is highly correlated  with other corruption-related  variables
derived from the survey data.  We believe the consistent  findings across measures
significantly enhance  the reliability of the bribe data.
Of the  176 firms that  answered  the question  on graft,  33 reported  that  they
did not  have to pay bribes,  while 143 reported  positive graft.  As shown in Table
2, there  are noticeable  differences between the two groups of firms corresponding
to  the  model's  prediction.12 Non-bribing  firms tend  to  have characteristics  sug-
gesting they  are operating  in  sectors with  little  or no contact  with  bureaucrats.
They receive significantly less public infrastructure  services, they are less involved
in  foreign trade,  and  pay  less taxes  (particularly  when  controlling  for  tax  ex-
emptions).  Moreover, they spend significantly less time  dealing with  government
regulations  and  less money on accountants  and  specialized  service providers  to
deal with  regulations  and taxes.
At the same time,  the  groups are similar  with  respect  to  cost  of security  (in
fact the  cost of security per  worker is higher for the group  of non-bribing  firms)
and the incidence of robbery  and theft.  These results  suggest that  while being in
sectors where bureaucrats  have low control rights  over firms' business operations
insulates  such firms from public corruption,  it does not  protect  them  from other
sources of discretionary  redistribution  such as theft.
The average firm in the non-bribing group is smaller (measured  by number of
workers), but  the  difference is not  significant when all firms are included  in the
samples.  Dropping three outliers  (two standard  deviations  above the mean) from
the group of firms reporting  no bribe payments,  however, results  in  a significant
difference in  size between  the  two groups  (p-value 0.02), with  non-bribing  firms
being smaller.
For  the  firms that  reported  positive  bribes,  the  average  amount  of corrupt
payments  was about  USD 8,300 (in 1997), with  a median payment  of USD 1,800.
'2As a consistency check, we compared the subsample of firms that  reported zero bribe pay-
ments with the subsample that reported positive graft to control if the former group systemat-
ically answered "difficult" questions with "O". However,  there is no significant difference  in the
share of zeros reported  to questions such as cost of security, profit  tax,  and  investment,  between
the  two subsamples.
14These  are  large  amounts,  corresponding  to  USD  88 per  worker,  or  roughly  8
percent  of total  costs." 3 The median  firm paid bribes  equivalent to  28 percent  of
its investment in machinery and equipment.  The distribution  of bribes is depicted
in Figure  3a-3b.
4.3.  Results
Table  3 reports  a series of probit  regressions,  corresponding  to  equation  (4.2),
which attempt  to  explain  the probability  that  a firm faces a corrupt  bureaucrat
and  therefore  needs to  pay  bribes  (gi > 0),  as a function  of sector and  location
specific variables.  The  dependent  variable is a zero-one dummy taking  the value
1 if the  firm reported  positive bribe payments  and zero otherwise.  Data  sources
and definitions are reported  in the appendix.
As shown  in  Table  3, the  incidence of corruption  is significantly  correlated
with  several of the  proxies of formality, or sectors  over which bureaucrats  have
high control rights.  Thus, firms receiving public services and are engaged in trade
(measured  either  as share of export  [export] or as a  dummy variable  taking  the
value 1 if the firm either  exports  or imports  or both  and  zero otherwise  [trade]),
have a higher probability  of facing a corrupt  bureaucrat  and  therefore  of having
to  pay bribes.  Firms that  pay more types  of taxes  also face a higher probability
of paying bribes,  particularly  when controlling for tax  exemptions.  The  pay tax
variable does not  enter  significantly different from zero in  Regression 4, but  this
result is partly  due to the fact that  several of the non-tax-paying  firms are formally
exempt  from paying taxes.  Thus,  the  pay tax  variable captures  both  firms that
due  to  their  location  do not  pay  tax,  and  formal  sector  firms that  are exempt
from paying tax.  We can partly  correct for this  by interacting  a measure  of tax
exemptions  with the pay tax index.  The results  are reported  in Regression 5. The
pay tax variable now enters  significantly at  the 5 percent  level.
The  proxies of formality  are highly correlated.  The  correlation  between  pay
tax and  trade (infrastructure  services) is 0.60 (0.47), and  the correlation  between
trade and  infrastructure  services is 0.35. To avoid multicollinearity  problems the
three variables  are combined to a  "formal sector index"  by principal  components
analysis.  The variable formal  sector is the first principal  component.  The result
of using  this  composite  variable  is reported  in  Regression  6 and  illustrated  in
Figure 4. As predicted,  firms active in the formal sector have a higher probability
of facing a corrupt  bureaucrat  and paying bribes.
We next turn  to equation  (4.4) and  an explicit examination  of the  amount  of
13For comparison, the cost of fuel (which is heavily taxed and  considered expensive) con-
stituted on average 6.2 percent of total costs, wages  constituted on average 17.9 percent, and
interest payments to total costs constituted 6.8 percent.
15bribes  paid."4 To estimate  this  equation  data 'on current  profits,  capital  stock,
sunk cost component, and labor force are needed. Profits are defined as gross sales
less operating  costs  and interest  payments  (profit).  Capital  stock is measured  as
the  resale value of plant  and  equipment  (capital  stock); that  is,  the  monetary
value the  firm manager  reported  it would get if it  sold all of its  machinery  and
equipment.  Labor force is total  employment (employment).  All data  are for 1997
and the monetary  values are expressed in US dollars.
The  extent  to  which  a  firm's  production  technology  is sunk  is not  directly
observable and  we therefore  choose to estimate  it using data  on reported  capital
stock values.  Managers  were asked to  provide a valuation  of their  firms'  assets.
Apart  from resale value; i.e., the value of a firm's  stock of capital on the market,
managers reported  the  "replace value"; that  is, how much it would cost to replace
all machinery  and  equipment  with  similar  new assets.  The  ratio  of these  two
values (resale to replace) captures  the extent of physical depreciation  of the asset,
transaction  costs (size of second-hand market),  and relative price effects (changes
in prices of final goods that  determine  the underlying  profitability  of the capital
stock).  In the model, the sunk cost component  a  is directly related  to  the latter
two effects of liquidating  the capital  stock.  To capture  this,  we regress the ratio
of resale to replace values of the  capital  stock  to the  average age of the capital
stock and a constant  (all variables in logs). The residual in this  regression  (sunk
cost component) then captures  the part  of the divergence between the resale and
replacement  values of capital  that  does not  depend on physical depreciation.  A
negative value indicates  a sunk capital stock.
The dependent  variable, gi,  is reported  bribe payments  to  public officials (in
US dollars), both  in nominal values (in Table 5-6), in logarithms  (in Table 7-8),
and  per  employee (Table 9-10).  The basic model identifies a linear relationship.
However, the linear relationship  is not  likely to  be robust  to  slight modifications
of the model, as discussed in section 3.
Regression 1 (Table 5) reports  the base specification.  The standard  errors are
derived from the appropriate  covariance matrix of -y  for which heteroskedasticity  is
explicitly taken into account.1 5 All variables enter significantly and with expected
signs.  Corruption  is positively correlated  with current  profits, employment,  cap-
ital  stock,  and  negatively  correlated  with the  alternative  return  to  capital.' 6An
increase in the stock of capital has a positive "direct" effect on required bribe pay-
ments, but  due to partly  sunk investments it also affects the equilibrium amount
14Summary  statistics  are reported  in Table  4.
"See Heckman  (1979)  for  an expression  of the asymptotic  covariance  matrix.
16The  sunk cost component  is a generated  regressor.  As such,  the estimates  of the standard
errors  may be biased. However,  under the null  hypothesis  that the estimated  coefficient  on ak
is zero,  the standard errors are unbiased. Thus, the t-statistic for the null  hypothesis  is not
invalidated  (Pagan, 1984).
16of graft through  the multiplicative  term a&k'. The marginal effect of kI is positive
for ai  <  0.023, implying  that  for roughly  76 percent  of the  firms in  the  sample
capital  investment  is associated  with higher bribe payments.
There  are two apparent  outliers  in the  sample:  one firm reported  (negative)
profits  almost 7 standard  deviations  below the mean  (6.5 standard  deviations  be-
low zero), and  one  firm reported  bribe  payments  almost  8 standard  deviations
above the  mean. 17 Regression  2 displays the  same regression once these outliers
are dropped  from  the  sample.  The fit of the  regression  improves and  the  stan-
dard  errors  of all variables  are significantly reduced.  The  standard  errors of the
regression are reduced  by more than  one-third.
In Regression 3 we add  the sunk cost proxy  to control  if the restricted  spec-
ification  reported  in  Regressions  1-2 is valid.  The  sunk cost  variable  enters  in-
significantly  and  all other  results  are unchanged,  thereby  providing  support  for
the restricted  specification employed.
The base  specification  is augmented  with  additional  controls  in columns  (4)-
(5).  Regression 4 adds a proxy of the degree of competition  (number of competi-
tors  for the  firm's  principal  product).  An approach  to  corruption  control  often
put  forward  suggests  that  increasing  competition  may  be  a  way to  reduce  the
returns  from  corrupt  activities  (see e.g.,  Rose-Ackerman,  1999).  However, once
the  variables  proxying  for  -yi are  included,  the  degree  of competition  adds  no
new information.  This  result supports  recent  theoretical  work on corruption  and
competition  which stresses that  both  variables are endogenously determined  (see
discussion  in section  3 and  below).  If this  is the  case it is incorrect  to take  the
number  of firms as an  indicator  of the  level of competition  in the  market,  since
corruption  affects the  flow of returns  from a particular  investment  and  thus  the
number  of firms in a free-entry  equilibrium  (see Bliss and  Di Tella, 1997).
The model discussed in section 2 deals with bureaucratic  extortion.  Obviously
there  are  other  reasons  for why one  would observe  bribes  in  equilibrium.  For
instance,  firms might  bribe public  officials to  receive public  contracts,  favorable
tax  treatment,  exemptions  from regulations,  etc..  It is difficult to find data  that
could proxy for these  other  sources of corruption.  However, in  Regression  5 we
add  one such  indicator:  a  dummy  variable  taking  the  value  1 if the  firm sells
part  of its  output  to  the  government.  The  presumption  is that  firms  actively
involved with  the government  face stronger  incentives to bribe  public officials for
current  and  future  contracts.  Controlling  for profits,  employment,  capital  stock,
and to what extent  the firm's capital is sunk, the sell to government  dummy enters
insignificantly  and  all other  variables  remain  unchanged.  Of course,  this  result
by itself does not  exclude the possibility that  firms are bribing  public officials for
17We suspect the outliers are due to reporting errors. The two observations are outliers also in
the regressions, i.e., based on the residuals, and remain outliers when scaling with employment.
17contracts  and exemptions,  but simply suggests that  the "prices" of these favors are
functions of the firms'  ability  to pay  (see further  the discussion below on reverse
causation) .
We experimented  with several other potential  explanatory  variables, including
industrial  category dummies, regional dummies, and market  share.  None of these
variables  had  any significant effect on graft once the variables  identified  by the
model (-yi) were included.
Table 6 displays the base specification with the logarithm  of bribe payment  as
dependent  variable.  Using the logarithm  of graft as dependent  variable improves
the  fit of the model.  In Regression  1, all variables  enter  significantly  at  the  1
percent  level. The results  are similar if we add additional  controls  (Regression 2).
In Table 7 we reestimate  the model (4.4) with  all variables expressed  in loga-
rithms.  This has the well-known advantage that  the coefficients can be interpreted
as elasticities.  However, since both profit and  the sunk cost component take neg-
ative  values, we have to add  constants  to  these terms.  This  in turn  implies that
the elasticities of bribe payments with respect to these variables  are not  constant.
In the base specification  reported  in  column (1), all variables  again  enter highly
significant.  The  results  are  also robust  to  the  inclusion  of additional  controls
(Regression 2) and hold if we let the sunk cost proxy enters linearly (not shown).
Yet another  concern is that  the results  are driven by spurious  correlation  (all
variables  are correlated  with  size). Simply controlling for size may not  overcome
this.  To control for this  possibility  we reestimated  the model in rates  by scaling
all variables with employment  size. In Table 8, the dependent  variable is thus  re-
ported  bribe payment  in USD per employee. As evident,  the relationship  between
current  and expected  profit rates  (the latter  proxied by capital/employment)  and
the  bribe  rate  continues  to  hold.  Also, the  alternative  return,  scaled  by  size,
remains  significantly correlated  with  the bribe rate.
Up until now we have relied on the restrictions  of the model to estimate  equa-
tion (4.4). Specifically, the model places restrictions  on the supply of bribes  (firms'
incentives to pay bribes).  In the model profits  are exogenous and  not  influenced
by the  amount  paid in  bribes.  However, other  assumptions  on the  supply  side
would suggest that  firms that  pay high bribes get valuable government  favors in
return  (e.g., they  obtain  valuable licenses, preferential  market  access, control  of
privatized  companies,  etc.).  Thus,  there  may be  a  causal  relation  between  the
level/rate  of bribes  and  profits; that  is, the results  may be influenced by reverse
causation.  Similarly, profits and  corruption  may be jointly  determined  to the ex-
tent  that  corruption  may cause exit or restrict  entry which may affect profits of
the remaining firms and  thus their potential  to pay bribes.
As stressed above, it should be noted that  for the reverse causation  argument
to influence the results  it must  be the case that  the size of the  government  favor
18is linked to the amount paid in bribes.  A simple extension of the model presented
above (yielding the same empirical predictions)  is that  all bribe-paying  firms re-
ceive preferential  government  treatment,  for instance  they  obtain  a  valuable li-
cense.  Our identifying assumption  is that  the  price of this  license is determined
by the firm's ability to  pay.
We deal with  the potential  endogeneity problem  by instrumenting  for profits
using two different sets of instruments.  Finding appropriate  instruments  in a firm-
level data  set is not easy.  In particular  this  is so since it requires assumptions  of
the hitherto  unmodelled  determinants  of profits.
The first set  of instruments  consists of firm specific variables  which we argue
are uncorrelated  with  both  the error  term  in  (4.4) and  reported  bribes,  but  are
correlated  with  firms' profit potential  (and realized profits).  The  instrument  set
includes  proxies  of human  and  social  capital:  a  dummy  variable  indicating  if
the  owner/manager  has  a University  diploma  (university);  a dummy  indicating
if the  owner/manager  has had  previous experience  from working abroad  or in a
foreign owned firm (experience); age of the firm (age); and  a measure of foreign
ownership (foreign).  These variables are presumably  correlated with  productivity
and profits.  An indicator  that  is the  case is provided  in Reinikka  and  Svensson
(1999).  In  a  large  panel  of firms  from  five African  countries  they  show  that
foreign ownership,  age,  and  experience are  good predictors  of profits.  We also
include the  distance  (distance)  to the main trading  center,  the capital  Kampala,
which presumably  affect firms' operating  costs.  The last instrument  is the cost of
security per employee (cost of securTity  per employee).  As discussed in Collier and
Gunning (1999), risk arising from, for example, crime is an important  determinant
of the performance of African enterprises.  The cost of security is one proxy of the
cost of risk management.
As depicted  in Table 5 there  are other  variables  which are uncorrelated  with
reported  bribes,  but  potentially  correlated  with  profits, such  as number  of com-
petitors  and market share.  However, since there might be an indirect link between
these variables and corruption,  we do not include them as instrument.  In so doing
we attempt  to identify the "exogenous" component  of profit, and thus  control for
the possible feedback from corruption  to profits through  the market  structure.
As  a  complement  we try  a  different instrument  strategy  by using  industry-
location averages of profits as instrument.  This is a potentially  good candidate  for
an instrument  since the data  reveal that  there  are systematic  differences in profit
rates across sectors.  Presumably, having netted  out the firm-specific component  of
profits, the differences in observed profits depend on the underlying characteristics
of the industries  and/or  locations  that  determine their  profitability.  Furthermore
we know that  in the  sample  of bribe-paying  firms,  the  industrial  and  regional
dummies are uncorrelated  with  the reported  level of bribe  payments  holding the
19other controls constant.
Table 9 reports  the results of using instrument  variables techniques, with bribe
rate  (bribe payment  in USD per employee) as dependent  variable." 8 All variables
continue to  enter significant.  The coefficients on the profit rate  are in fact  even
larger than  those  reported  above.  This  result  is likely driven  by the  fact  that
the  IV-strategy  also mitigates  the  attenuation  bias due  to  measurement  errors.
Despite the data  collection strategy  profits are likely to be a noisy variable.  The
instruments  perform well. The first set of instruments  increase the R2 in the first-
stage regression by 6 percentage  points.  The Hausman  test  also reveals that  we
cannot reject  the null hypothesis  of the  validity of the  instruments;  that  is, we
find no evidence that  the instruments  for the profit rate  belong in the corruption
regression.
Despite the IV-results it should be stressed that  in reality some firms may still
benefit (and possibly a lot) from corruption.  What this type of econometric work
identifies is what is true on average, or in general, and on average the data  suggest
that  the level and rate of grafts are driven by the firms' abilities to pay. This result
is also consistent with  other  preliminary  work on the  Uganda  data  set.  Fisman
and  Svensson (1999) show that  once controlling for possible simultaneity  biases,
there is a strong negative relationship between bribery payments and firm growth
(growth in  sales or  employment).  The  effect is about  three  times greater  than
that  of taxation  and  much stronger after outliers are excluded.  Svensson (1999),
studying the cost of obtaining  connection to public services, finds that  there is no
relationship between the cost (including informal payments) and the time it takes
to get connected to the public grid and/or  acquire a telephone line.  Both studies
hence suggest that  firms paying higher bribes on average do not receive faster or
more valuable services in return.
In Table  10 we have calculated the effects on corruption  (bribe payment)  of:
(i)  a  one  standard  deviation  increase  in  the  explanatory  variables,  and  (ii) a
one-percent increase in the explanatory variables.  The calculations  show that  the
effects identified in the model are qualitatively large. For example, a one-standard
deviation increase in profits is associated with roughly USD 100 in additional bribe
payments per employee (equal to 0.76 standard deviations), while an one-standard
deviation reduction  in the  sunk cost component  implies a reduction  in bribes  of
around one-third  standard  deviation.
' 8The results are very similar, though slightly weaker than  those reported  above, when running
the  regression  in levels; i.e., not scaling  with number of employees.
205.  Implications
In the model corruption  has potentially  two adverse consequences. It  discourages
investment  in  sector  s1  and  shifts  production  to  sector  52.  We label  this  the
allocation  effect.  Note that  although  bureaucrats  realize that  demanding  bribes
may cause exit, they do not take into account how exit affects the overall allocation
of firms between different sectors.
Second,  if firms  not  only  can choose between  sectors,  but  realistically  also
can choose what  technology  to  apply, firms will tend  to  pick a  more reversible
(but  possibly less efficient) capital  stock.  We label this  the technology effect.  In
appendix  A.2. we elaborate  on these two effects and show that  they are functions
of the parameters  of the model.
6.  Concluding  remarks
15 years  ago in  the  Handbook of Econometrics  survey of economic data  issues,
Griliches (1986) observed  " ...since it is the  "badness"  of the  data  that  provides
us with  our living, perhaps  it  is not  at all surprising  that  we have shown little
interest  in improving it, in  getting  involved in the grubby  task  of designing and
collecting original  dataset  of our  own".  Griliches observation  is still  a fair one
when it comes to  data  on governance and  corruption.  One contribution  of this
paper  has  been the  collection of what  we believe to  be  an  unique  data  set  to
analyze  the  causes  and  consequences of corruption  at  the  firm level.  Despite
our data  collection strategy,  however, there  are likely to be cases of misreporting
in  the  sample,  and  for  this  reason  the  paper  has  not  focused  on  the  level or
incidence of bribes,  but  rather  on their correlates.  We believe that  the strategy
used to  collect information  on grafts has minimized any systematic  biases in the
correlation between reported  grafts and the set of controls we use.
To guide the empirical analysis we have developed a simple model of bureau-
cratic extortion.  The model yielded predictions  on both  the  incidence of bribery
and the  amount  paid,  and  both  predictions  are consistent  with  the  data.  Firms
typically  have to pay  bribes  when dealing with  public officials whose actions  di-
rectly  affect the  firms'  business operations,  and  such dealings  cannot  be  easily
avoided when, for example, exporting,  importing,  or requiring  public infrastruc-
ture  services.  Further,  the  amount  paid  is a  function  of firm characteristics:  a
firm's  current  and  expected  future  profits and  to what  extent  the  firm's  capital
stock is sunk.  Thus, the amount of bribes paid does not  appear  to be a fixed sum
for given public services, but  depends on firms' abilities to pay - the more a firm
could pay the more it has to pay. Or in other words, the  "price" a firm must  pay
21for a given service is a function  of the firm's  ability to pay.  We have shown that
these findings are robust  to a number of potential  statistical  problems.
These results  have clear policy implications  (for an elaborated  discussion on
policy issues see Svensson, 2000). If the bribe a firm needs  to pay is an  outcome
of a bargaining  process, collective actions on the part  of the business community
so as to strengthen  the bargaining  position of individual firms may be a successful
strategy  to  reduce the cost of doing business in countries  suffering from systemic
corruption  (collecting and disseminating information  about  corrupt  practices;  in-
forming the private  sector  and the public about  service standard,  guidelines and
norms of major  service providers; increasing individual firms ability to commit to
no-bribery;  and recognizing those how are doing a good work by resisting corrup-
tion, are examples of such measures).
Another potential  reform involves giving bureaucrats  overlapping jurisdictions
to  reduce  their  monopoly  power,  as  discussed  in  Rose-Ackerman  (1999).  The
ability to extract rents would fall if firms could simply refuse to deal with a corrupt
official and  try  someone else. However, as noted by Rose-Ackerman,  competitive
bureaucracy  has  limited  value in  cases where officials impose costs  rather  than
benefits (e.g., having two rather  than  one policeman knocking on the door asking
for bribes may not  be preferable),  so the potential  overall effect of such a reform
might not  be large.
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25A.  Appendix
A.1.  Data  description  and  sources
All data  used in the paper are from the Ugandan Industrial Enterprise  Survey (see
Reinikka and Svensson, 1999, for details).  The survey was initiated  by the World
Bank primarily to collect data on constraints facing private enterprises in Uganda and
was implemented during the period January-June 1998 by the Ugandan Manufactur-
ers Association (an employers' association).  The enumerators were trained by World
Bank survey experts.  The sampling frame was based on an Industrial census from
1996 and was confined to  five general industrial categories (commercial agriculture,
agro-processing,  other manufacturing, construction, and tourism). Based on number of
enterprises, these five sectors constituted 52 percent of the private sector, and almost
80 percent of employment in 1996.  The chosen sample size was 250 establishments
(out of 1282 enterprises in the census in the five industrial categories). Within these
five industrial categories, commercial  agriculture made up 26 percent of employment,
agro-processing  28 percent, other manufacturing 32 percent, construction  12 percent
and tourism 2 percent.  Balancing  the importance of the different industrial categories
at present with the likely importance in the future, the initial plan prescribed selecting
50 establishments in commercial  agriculture, 50 in agro-processing,  100 in other manu-
facturing, 25 in construction, and 25 in tourism. Five geographical  regions were covered
in the sample (Kampala, Jinja/Iganga, Mbale/Tororo, Mukono, and Mbarara). These
regions constitute more than 70 percent of total employment. Three general criteria
governed the choice of procedure in selecting the sample from the eligible establish-
ments. First, the sample should be at least reasonably  representative of the population
of establishments in the specified  industrial categories. Second, the establishments sur-
veyed  should account for a substantial share of national output in each of the industrial
categories.  Third, the sample should be sufficiently  diverse in  terms of firm size to
enable empirical analysis on the effects  of firm size. To account for these three consid-
erations, a stratified random sample was chosen using employment shares as weights.
The final sample surveyed constituted 243 firms and was fairly similar to the initially
selected stratified sample, both with respect to location and size.
The survey instrument had roughly 500 entries and a handful of them were related
to  corruption.  Bribe payments were reported under  the following  question, "Many
business people have told us that  firms are often required to make informal payments
to public officials  to deal with customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc.  Can
you estimate what a firm in your line of business and of similar size and characteristics
typically pays each year?". The question was asked at the end of the interview by which
time the enumerator would have established a necessary  credibility and trust.
Other variables: capital stock = resale value of plant and equipment in USD (1997);
competitors  = number of competitors for the firm's  principal product; cost of accountant
= monthly cost of accountant, lawyer, agent, specialized service provider to deal with
regulation and taxes in USD (1997); cost of security = annual cost of security in USD
26(1997); distance  =  distance  (miles) from  Kampala;  employment  =  total  employment
(1997); experience  = binary  variable  taking  the  value 1 if the  owner/manager  has  had
previous  experience  from working  abroad  or in  a  foreign owned  firm;  export =  share
of sales exported  (1997); foreign  =  foreign ownership  in percent;  formal  sector  = first
principal  component  derived  from  principal components  analysis  of 'trade',  'pay  tax',
'infrastructure  service';  infrastructure  service  =  index  (0-5)  of availability  of public
services  (electricity,  water,  telephones,  waste  disposal,  paved  roads),  1 if available  0
otherwise,  index  is the  sum  of the  binary  availability  variables  for  the  five services;
incidence  of robbery and  theft  =  binary  variable  taking  the  value  1 if the  firm was a
victim  of robbery,  and/or  theft  during  1995-1997, 0 otherwise;  pay  tax  =  index  (0-6),
sum of six binary  (0=no,  1=yes) variables  reflecting types of taxes  the firm pays (import
duty,  import  commission,  withholding  tax,  excise tax, VAT, corporate  tax  [profit tax])
(1997); profit  =  gross sales less operating  costs  and  interest  payments  in USD  (1997);
sunk  cost  component  =  residual  from the  regression  of the  ratio  of resale  to  replace
values of the  capital  stock  to  the  average age of the  capital  stock  and  a  constant  (all
variables in logs); sell to government  = binary variable taking  the value  1 if the firm sells
part  of its output  to the  government,  0 otherwise;  tax exemptions  =  index  (0-2) of tax
exemptions  on corporate  tax,  import  duties,  with  Q=no exemptions,  2=fully  exempted;
time spent  dealing with taxes and regulations =  percentage  of senior management's  time
spent  each month  dealing with  government  regulations  (1997); trade = binary  variable
taking  the value  1 if the firm either  exports  or imports  itself or both  and zero otherwise
(1997);  university  =  binary  variable  taking  the  value  1 if the  owner/manager  has  a
University  diploma.
A.2.  Implications  and  extensions
A.2.1.  Asymmetric  information
In reality  a bureaucrat  does not have full information  about  a firm from who he wishes
to  extract  bribes.  The  shock  0 and  profits  are  not  directly  observed,  neither  is the
sunk  cost component.  Incomplete  information  will create  informational  rents  that  the
firms can capture.  Thus,  the  linear  relationship  between  profits  and  grafts  identified in
equation  (2.6) will only be  an  approximation.  As an example,  assume  0 (and  7r) can
take two values, high profits  7r(k,  OH),  which occurs  with  probability  2, and  low profits
7r(k,  OL).  Furthermore,  consider  the  case when  the  bureaucrats  only  receive  a signal,
Os, of the  state  of nature.  Os is equal to  the true  state  with  probability  u >  1.  Let 9L
be the level of graft  that  solves
7r(k,  OL I  |1)  - gL  + Et E'  13fn  [7r(k,  Ot+n,  | s1)  - pt+n(sl)gL]
=  1n=I  3l'n-r(ak,  '1  S2)
27and  9H  be the level of graft  that  solves
7r(k, OH I  S1) - gH +  Et  E  /3  [7r(k,  0 t+n,  |  Is)  -pt+.(sl)9H]
=  Eni  1`i7r(ak,  -1 S2)
That  is,  9L  (9H)  is  the  level of  graft  that  makes  the  firm  in  bad  [good] states
indifferent  between  paying  the  demanded  bribes  and  exiting.  It  is straightforward  to
show that  if gL > AIH, the bureaucrat  would demand graft gL in each period irrespective
of the  signal, and  the  firm would capture  the informational  rents.19
A.2.2.  The  allocation  effect
The allocation  effect  is similar to  a highly progressive profit  tax:  corruption  creates  a
wedge between the  (marginal)  product  of capital  and  the  return  that  can be privately
appropriated  by the  investor, and  the more so the  higher the  profits.
To evaluate  the  economy-wide consequences  of this  allocation  effect note  that  we
assume that  firms take  into  account the  corrupt  bureaucrats'  behavior  when choosing
where to locate.  Substituting  (2.6) into the firm's value function  yields
V(k  I  si)  T(P(r,)P  (k,  P,  lsi)  +  l_-7+)(ak,  lS2)]  (A-1)
and
V(k  I  S2) =  (1  *I  S2)  (A.2)
A  firm will invest in sector  1 provided that  V(k  I  si)  > V(k  I  s2)-  Since V(k  I  si)  is
an increasing function  of 77,  it follows that  the share  of entrepreneurs  locating  in sector
s,  is 1  - G(?),  where the cutoff value I1  is implicitly defined by equating  (A.1) and (A.2).
Thus,  provided that  the  expected  return  to  capital  in sector  s,  is sufficiently high,
entrepreneurs  with a comparative  advantage  of production  in sector sl will invest there.
Note that  absent corruption,  more firms would invest in sector  si.  Specifically, without
corruption  the  share of entrepreneurs  investing in sector s,  is (1 - G(,q)) > (1 - G(7)))
where y7  is implicitly  defined by
*r(k; 11)  -)-r(k,  -|  82) =  0  (A.3)
The severity  of the  allocation  effect depends  on a  and  p.
dn  <  O,  D~ >  O  (A-4)
dot  dp
A less reversible capital  stock raises the firm's potential  loss of exiting  sector s,  and,
everything  else equal, results in higher bribe payments  and lower profits in equilibrium.
J 9The informational  rent is equal to the expected graft with full information  2  (9(OH  ) +  g(OL)),
less graft with incomplete information  9Lg
28Lower net  profits  in  sector  si  implies that  fewer firms will find  it  profitable  to invest
there.  Likewise, an  increase  in the  probability  that  public  officials will demand  bribes
raises  expected  grafts  Eopg(Ot) and  reduces  expected  net  profits.  As a  result,  fewer
firms will invest in sector  si.
A.2.3.  Technology  effect
The second effect, the technology  effect, would arise if firms not only could choose where
to locate,  but  also could  choose what  technology  to  apply, or more  precisely  what  type
of capital  goods  to  purchase.  Absent  corruption,  the  extent  to  which  the  technology
is sunk  or not  would not  affect  the  firm's  investment  decision.  Thus,  the  firm would
buy  capital  goods  so as to  maximize  7r(k, - j).  With  corruption,  the  decision  is more
complex,  since  the  cost  of exiting  affects  the  firm's  "bargaining"  position  versus  the
bureaucrat.  A less sunk  capital  stock implies that  the  cost  of exiting  becomes  smaller,
and  from equation  (2.6),  lower grafts  when. matched  with  a corrupt  official.  Thus,  the
firm  might  find  it profitable  to  choose a  "technology"  that  yields a  lower gross return
7(k,- .1j),  but  indirectly  reduces  the  amount  of bribes  the firm needs  to  pay.
The  trade-off  can be evaluated  using the  value  function  (A.1).  Let  the  pair  {k, a}
capture  the  "technology"  choice of the firm.  Absent corruption,  the  optimal  technology
is {lk*,  a*}.  Assume that  the  firm can choose a less sunk  investment  a  > a*, but  this  is
more  expensive  so less productive  capital  could be installed  k <  k*.
Would  the  firm  find  it  profitable  to  choose  a  less productive  but  more  reversible
capital  investment?  Differentiating  the value function  with  respect  to k  and  a  yields
dV(. I si)  = 'PkdTr(k, 1,.1si)  +  dr(ak,-Is 2 )
dk  ~~dk  dkc
dV(.l s5)  d7r(ak,  *1  s2)
doa  doa
where f  k-  +P  and 9a--  -2  )+p1)  - Thus, the marginal effects depend on
the  composite  coefficients  f  k  and  p.  Note  that  f  k  [9a] is a decreasing  (increasing)
function  of p.  In  Figures  5a-5b  the  composite  coefficients  and  the  ratio  k/SOk  are
plotted.  If the  incidence of bribery  is high, the  relative  return  of adopting  a technology
with inefficiently  low sunk  cost component  is also high.  In other  words,  the  higher the
probability  of meeting  a corrupt  bureaucrat,  the  stronger  the  incentives  to  invest in a
more reversible  capital  stock.  Note that  the  gain of investing  in less sunk  capital  does
not result from lower realized costs of exiting,  since in equilibrium  the firm will not exit,
but from higher expected  net profits since the manager's  leverage in the negotiation  with
the  bureaucrats  increases,  and  as a result  equilibrium  graft  falls.
29Figure 1: Partial correlation (graft & connection  costs-public grid)
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Excess  cost  of telephone  connectionTable 1. Partial  correlation: Connection  costs  and bribery(i)  (ii)
Equation  W w)(w)  (2)(v)
Dependent  variable  Connection  costs  Excess cost of
public  grid (log)  telephone
connection  (log)
Constant  9.162  10.75
(.000)  (.000)
Bribe payments  (log)  0.508  0.068
(.000)  (.001)
Adjusted  R2  0.44  0.15
Observations  25  62
Note:  (i) standard errors  adjusted  for heteroskedasticity (White,  1980); (ii)  p-values in
parenthesis; (iii) regression 1 includes a proxy of informality (infrastructure service); (iv)
connection costs (public grid) has mean 6,330,400 USh and median 2,500,000 USh; (v)
excess cost of telephone connection has mean 155,600 USh and median 90,000 USh.Table  2: Sample  characteristics
Firms that reported  Firms that reported  p-value
zero bribe payments  positive bribe payments
Infrastructure service  3.24  3.70  0.048
Export  0.15  0.33  0.016
Pay tax  2.58  3.04  0.184
Pay tax  2.50  3.28  0.031
(not tax exempted only)
Time spent dealing with  1.93  2.49  0.016
taxes and regulations (log)
Cost of accountant etc.  3.30  4.74  0.016
(log)
Cost of security (log)  7.17  7.48  0.569
Incidence of robbery and  0.52  0.58  0.497
theft
Employment size (log)  3.61  3.88  0.342
Note: (i) average  values  in  columns  two  and three;  (ii) numbers  in the fourth  column  are p-values  for a
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Equation  (1)  |  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Dep. variable  Incidence  Incidence  Incidence  Incidence  Incidence  Incidence
of graft  of graft  of graft  of graft  of graft  of graft
Constant  .203  .747  .647  .613  .309  .179
(.554)  (.000)  (.000)  (.004)  (.255)  (.588)
Employment  8.36E-5  -7.58E-5  . -7.94E-5  -7.66E-5  -1.28E-4  -.000











Pay taxes*  -.240
exemption  (.071)
Formnal  sector  .151
index  (.038)
Observations  176  176  167  173  172  T  167
Note:  (i) dependent  variable  "incidence  of graft" takes  the value 1  if the firm reported  positive  bribe  payments
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Note:  Based  on regression  6, Table 3, with  size evaluated  at the mean.Table 4: Sample characteristics of firms that reported positive bribes(i)(ii
All firms  All firms(II.)  Firms reporting  Firms reporting
low bribe  high bribe
payments(iv)  payments(iii)
Profit
-mean  211,060  284,390  57,540  540,110
-median  27,270  27,270  11,230  95,690
-Std. dev.  1,134,460  1,048,116  119,660  1,489,290
Bribes
-mean  7,850  6,270  280  13,020
-median  910  910  180  9,090
- Std. dev.  19,840  13,480  280  17,390
Resale value
-mean  365,760  346,760  174,550  540,890
-median  90,910  90,910  38,640  227,270
-Std. Dev.  667,190  648,260  394,500  809,010
Employment
-mean  119  109  36  192
-median  34  33  20  81
-Std. dev.  262  251  53  346
Reversibility
-mean  .001  .001  .002  -.000
- median  .011  .011  .012  .009
-Std. dev.  .034  .034  .033  .035
Obs.  119  117  62  55
Note: (i) sample  of firms  for which  data on corruption  and other  variables  are available;  (ii) profits,  bribes,
resale  values  in USD;  (iii)  excluding  two  extreme  outliers;  (iv) low  bribe  payment  is graft  smaller  than
USD 1000.Table 5: Corruption regressions(i)  (ii)
Equation  (1)  (2)(ii)  (3)(ilx)  (4)(i  ..  (5)Iit)-
Dep. variable  Graft in  Graft in  Graft in  Graft in  Graft in
USD  USD  USD  USD  USD
Constant  9,531  8,701  8,910*  8,500*  8,178*
(6,693)  (4,509)  (5,101)  (4,609)  (4,169)
Profit  0.0033**  0.0037***  0.0036***  0.0036***  0.0036***
(.0014)  (.0010)  (.0010)  (.0011)  (.0010)
Employment  17.11  **  11.39**  11.53  11.48**  11.03**
(7.21)  (4.76)  (4.28)  (4.98)  (4.45)
Capital stock  0.0071  **  0.0059**  0.0061**  0.0060**  0.0063
(.0032)  (.0023)  (.0032)  (.0024)  (.0021)
Sunk cost component*  -0.309**  -0.259**  -0.290***  -0.259***  -0.274***
capital stock  (.119)  (.089)  (.096)  (.090)  (.081)
("alternative return")




Sell to government  -1,524
(2,063)
?(iv)  -16,638  -16,105  -16,489  -16,307  -13,781
(17,774)  (11,849)  (12,896)  (11,607)  (10,537)
Wald(v)  18.27  29.63  31.85  29.05"  36.10k
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
S.E. regression  18,728  12,168  12,184  12,278  11,075
Adjusted R2  0.11  0.18  0.18  0.18  0.22
Observations  119  117  117  116  114
Notes:  (i) standard  errors  in parenthesis  are adjusted  for heteroskedasticity  (Heckman,  1979);  (ii) ***
[**] (*) denote significant  at the 1 [5]  (10) percent  levels;  (iii) two  extreme outliers  dropped;  (iv) X  is
the  inverse  Mills  ratio  to  adjust  for  selectivity  with  selection  equation  given  by
P(ei=l)=I1(c,employment,formal),  i.e., Regression  6, Table 3; (v) Wald is the Wald-test  statistic  for
testing  if the coefficients  on the x, k, 1,  ocd  are zero with  p-values  in parenthesis.Table  6: Corruption  regressions(0'('00
Equation  (1)  (2)
Dep. Variable  Graft in USD  Graft in USD
(log)  (log)
Constant  8.83  8.86***
(.892)  (.698)
Profit  5.5E-7  5.4E-7***
(1.OE-7)  (1.5E-7)
Employment  0.0023  0.0023
(.0004)  (.0007)
Capital stock  9.8E-7*  1.0E-6**
(3.5E-7)  (3.3E-7)
Sunk cost component*  -3.5E-5  -3.7E-5**




Sell to government  -0.234
(.325)
x(iii)  -7.32***  -7.19
(2.15)  (1.66)
Wald(iv)  51.64  42.12
(0.00)  (0.00)
S.E. regression  1.74  1.73
Adjusted R2  0.35  0.35
Observations  117  113
Notes:  (i)  standard  errors  in  parenthesis  are  adjusted  for
heteroskedasticity (Heckman, 1979);  (ii)  ***  [**]  (*)  denote
significant  at the 1 [5] (10) percent levels;  (iii) X is the inverse  Mills
ratio to  adjust for  selectivity with selection equation given by
P(ei=1)=O(c,employment,formal), i.e., Regression  6, Table 3; (iv)
Wald  is the Wald-test  statistic  for testing  if the coefficients  on the z; k,
1, otk  are zero  with  p-values  in parenthesis.Table 7: Corruption  regressions(i) (ii)(iii)
Equation  (1)  (2)
Dep. Variable  Graft in USD  Graft in USD
(log)  (log)
Constant  -85.1***  84.7**
(28.6)  (30.5)
Profit  5.46***  5.46***
(logarithm)  (1.79)  (1.91)
Employment  0.649  0.614***
(logarithm)  (.162)  (.159)
Capital stock  1.50**  1.67**
(logarithm)  (.679)  (.686)
Sunk cost component*  -1.84**  -2.07**




Sell to government  -0.320
(.303)
Ri,(iv)  -3.17*  -2.96*
(1.78)  (1.72)
Wald(v)  63.85  66.76
(0.00)  (0.00)
S.E. regression  1.61  1.61
Adjusted R2  0.44  0.44
Observations  117  113
Notes:  (i)  standard  errors  in  parenthesis  are  adjusted  for
heteroskedasticity (Heckman, 1979);  (ii)  ***  [**]  (*)  denote
significant  at the 1 [5] (10) percent levels; (iii) a constant 1E+7 is
added to logarithm  of profit and a constant  2 is added to sunk cost to
avoid negative values; (iv) X is the inverse Mills ratio to adjust for
selectivity with selection equation P(ei=1)=O(c,employmentformal),
i.e., Regression  6, Table 3; (v) Wald is the Wald-test statistic for
testing if the coefficients  on the x, k, 1, ak are zero with p-values  in
parenthesis.Table 8: Corruption rate regressions(i)00)(iii)
Equation  (1)  (2)
Dep. Variable  Graft per  Graft per
employee in  employee in
USD  USD
Constant  120.1  117.2**
(45.1)  (47.9)
Profit per employee  0.0041  0.0042*
(7.4E-4)  (7.7E-4)
Capital stock per employee  0.0042*  0.0042*
(.0022)  (.0022)
Sunk cost component*  -0.238**  -0.240***
capital stock per employee  (.091)  (.090)
("alternative return per employee")
Competitors  -1.001
(1.289)
Sell to government  6.145
(22.94)
j(iii)  -175.2  -135.9
(119.2)  (116.9)
Wald(iv)  36.20  36.36
(0.00)  (0.00)
S.E. regression  123.0  122.6
Adjusted R2  0.21  0.21
Observations  117  113
Notes:  (i) standard  errors  in parenthesis  are adjusted  for heteroskedasticity  (Heckman,
1979);  (ii) *** [**]  (*) denote  significant  at the 1 [5]  (10) percent  levels;  (iii) X is the
inverse  Mills  ratio  to  adjust  for  selectivity  with  selection  equation
P(ej=1)=O(c,empIoyment,formaI),  i.e., Regression  6, Table 3; (vi) Wald  is the Wald-
test statistic  for testing if the coefficients  on the x, k, 1, cak  are zero with p-values  in
parenthesis.Table 9: IV-regressions on corruption (i),(i),(iii)
Equation  (l)(1v)  (2)(v)
Dep.  Variable  Graft  per  Graft  per
employee in  employee in
USD  USD
Constant  121.9**  112.8**
(53.27)  (54.5)
Profit per employee  .0052***  .0069***
(.0017)  (.0018)
Capital stock per employee  .0039*  .0037
(.0023)  (.0024)
Sunk cost component*  -0.246**  -0.260***
capital stock per employee  (.094)  (.098)
("alternative return per employee")
x(vi)  -189.2  -186.6
(144.8)  (147.6)




S.E. regression  122.8  128.2
Adjusted R2
Observations  117  114
Notes:  (i) standard  errors in parenthesis  are adjusted  for heteroscedasticity  (Heckman,
1979); (ii) *** [**] (*) denote significant  at the 1 [5]  (10) percent levels; (iii) 2SLS
estimation; (iv) instrument  vector consists  of industry-location  averages  of profit rate
plus the covariates  in (1);  (v) instrument  vector  consists  of the variables university,
experience,  foreign, distance,  age, cost of security  per employee  plus the covariates  in
(2); (vi) X is the inverse Mills ratio to adjust for selectivity  with selection equation
P(ei=1)=Ojc,  employmentformal); (vii) Wald is the Wald-test  statistic  for testing if
the coefficients  on the x, k, 1,  ak are zero with p-values  in parenthesis.  (viii) Hausman
is the TR 2-test statistic  for no overidentifying  restrictions,  with  p-values  in parenthesis.Table  10: Effects  on corruption  of changes  in firm  characteristics
Equation  (1)(i)  (2)(11)
Change in bribe  Change in bribe
payment USD  payment due to a
(st.d.) due to a one  one percent
standard deviation  increase in [%J
increase in
Resale value per employee  25.5
(0.19)
Profit per employee  104.2
(0.76)
Reversibility index  -42.1
(-0.31)
Resale value  0.218
Profits  0.152
Reversibility index  -0.118
Employment  0.632
Note: (i) Calculations  based on Regression  1; Table 9, with standard deviations  in
parenthesis. (ii) Calculations  based on Regression 1; Table 7.  The elasticity of
corruption  with  respect  to changes  in profit is y,*[2.8E5/(2.8E5+1E7)]  where 2.8E5  is
mean profit and 1E7 is the scale factor, the elasticity of corruption  with respect to
capital  is ya*ln(2+.011)+yk  where  .011  is the median  value  of the reversibility  index  and
2 is the scale  factor,  the elasticity  of corruption  with  respect  to the reversibility  index is
y,*ln(3.5E5)*[.01  1/(2+.01  1)]  where  3.5E5  is mean  capital  stock.~~~O~~~0C0  000  ~  ~  ~  ~  O  0 
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